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Abstract
Adapting to climate change poses unprecedented technical, 
administrative and political challenges for which New Zealand’s 
current planning, regulatory and funding frameworks are ill-
equipped. Without reform, they will deliver neither efficient nor 
equitable outcomes. Indeed, they will encourage governmental 
delay, incentivise sub-optimal solutions, increase future burdens, 
and reduce societal resilience. For sound anticipatory governance, 
our current frameworks need reform. This article summarises the 
nature of the adaptation challenges facing New Zealand, outlines 
the problems with current policy settings, identifies principles and 
considerations that should guide the reform agenda, and reviews 
several policy options. On balance, we favour creating a new national 
institution mandated to fund or co-fund, in accordance with 
statutory criteria, the major costs of adaptation.
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the case for a new  
policy framework
The task of mitigating climate change (i.e. reducing greenhouse gas emissions) has been called a 
‘super wicked’ policy problem (Lazarus, 
2009). But adapting to, and minimising 
the impacts of, climate change will be no 
less daunting (Mullan et al., 2013; OECD, 
2015; Reisinger et al., 2014). Indeed, 
adaptation poses unprecedented technical, 
administrative and political challenges. 
In effect, policymakers are confronted 
not only with an unparalleled, slow-
motion natural disaster, but also one that 
is destined to intensify in scope and scale 
as the century progresses. There will be 
multiple negative impacts: rising sea levels; 
more severe droughts and rainfall events; 
new biosecurity risks; an accelerated loss of 
biodiversity; and changing human disease 
vectors. Many of these phenomena will be 
outside the variability ranges previously 
experienced.
As an island nation, New Zealand will 
be particularly badly affected over the 
coming century and beyond by coastal 
erosion and inundation (Royal Society of 
New Zealand, 2016; Stephenson, McKenzie 
and Orchiston, 2017). Tens of thousands 
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of people – and perhaps more – will 
eventually need resettling on higher 
ground. Large investments will also be 
required to redesign, reposition and future-
proof public infrastructure, especially 
transport networks and water services. 
Additionally, the damage caused by climate-
related natural disasters will impose 
growing financial burdens – on citizens, 
businesses and public authorities. Already 
the annual cost of repairing land transport 
networks damaged by weather-related 
events has more than quadrupled over the 
past decade, while the economic impact of 
major floods and droughts is increasing. 
The series of major rainfall events which 
afflicted parts of New Zealand in early 2018 
are merely a foretaste of what lies ahead. 
Likewise, the visibility of recent plant 
pathogens affecting our native trees (e.g. 
myrtle rust and kauri die-back), on top of 
the stresses our natural ecosystems are 
exposed to from the combination of exotic 
animal pests (e.g. deer, possums, stoats, rats 
and mice), are a portend for the future 
facing New Zealand. 
Governments will face numerous policy 
challenges in seeking to reduce and mitigate 
such impacts. Many of the likely impacts 
are beset with ‘deep uncertainty’ (Walker, 
Lempert and Kwakkel, 2012; Walker, 
Marchau and Kwakkel, 2013), especially 
beyond mid-century. Policymakers will 
be faced with abrupt and unexpected 
biophysical changes; multiple, com-
pounding and cascading risks (between 
and across sectors and domains of interest); 
the complexities of planning over extremely 
long time horizons; and complicated intra-
generational and intergenerational trade-
offs (Lawrence et al., 2013; Lawrence et al., 
2016). Politically, too, there is an acute 
problem: the adaptation strategies needed 
to safeguard future interests will often 
entail significant upfront costs, not least to 
ensure that today’s investments can be 
adjusted depending on the evolution of 
climate change. Moreover, while such costs 
are visible, direct and relatively certain, 
many of the benefits are indirect and much 
less certain. Concerted public opposition 
to prudent, proactive, anticipatory 
measures is thus inevitable; all the more so 
if those who face substantial losses are 
unable financially to make the necessary 
adjustments in a timely and just manner. 
Are New Zealand’s current funding, 
planning and regulatory frameworks, and 
their related policy tools and instruments, 
well designed to meet the scope, scale and 
duration of the challenges of climate 
change adaptation? In our view, the answer 
is unequivocal: existing arrangements are 
not fit for purpose. They lack the capacity 
to ensure sound anticipatory governance.1 
They will not deliver equitable or efficient 
outcomes. This article explains why. In so 
doing, it gives particular attention to the 
weaknesses in current adaptation funding 
mechanisms and how these might be 
rectified. Here we highlight only a selection 
of issues and consider a limited number of 
policy options. Our primary purpose is to 
underscore the need for reform, rather 
than provide a fully-developed and 
compre-hensive policy approach.
The costs of climate change
Estimating the likely long-term costs of 
climate change poses significant analytical 
and technical challenges. Take, for instance, 
the costs of sea level rise, which is but one 
of the many anticipated impacts (Boettle, 
Rybski and Kropp, 2016; Hallegatte et al., 
2013; Hinkel et al., 2014; IPCC, 2014). The 
expected costs will depend on numerous 
variables, including: the time frames 
under consideration; the path of global 
greenhouse gas emissions; the projected 
impact of global warming on the polar ice 
sheets, ocean currents and storm patterns; 
the assumptions made about the pattern 
and scale of future human development; 
the nature and types of risks considered 
and their related costs (e.g. direct and 
indirect, market and non-market); 
how losses (e.g. of land, buildings and 
infrastructure) are valued; and the kind 
of adaptation measures or protection 
strategies adopted. 
Based on a study of 136 major coastal 
cities, Hallegatte et al. (2013) estimated 
that, in the absence of additional protective 
measures, sea level rise and related changes 
to storm surges, floods and major storms 
could cost globally as much as US$1 trillion 
annually by 2050 and multiple times this 
figure by 2100. Likewise, Hinkel et al. 
(2014) estimate that if the sea level rises by 
1.23 metres by 2100, and if no adaptation 
occurs, then up to 4.6% of the global 
population would be flooded annually, 
with expected losses of over 9% of global 
domestic product annually. Losses of this 
magnitude would be totally unsustainable. 
According to Hinkel et al., effective coastal 
adaptation measures, including managed 
retreat (see Box 1), can be expected to 
reduce these losses substantially (see also 
Reisinger et al., 2015). 
There are no comprehensive estimates 
of the costs of sea level rise for New Zealand 
over the coming century. But an initial 
study of exposed residents, buildings and 
some infrastructure (i.e. roads, railways, 
port and airport facilities, and critical 
facilities or government buildings) by Bell, 
Paulik and Wadwha (2015) for the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment (2015) provides an indication 
of the scale of costs. For instance, it is 
estimated that at least 43,683 homes (or 
about 133,000 people) and 1,448 
commercial properties are within 1.5 
metres of the current average high tide in 
spring (Bell, Paulik and Wadwha, 2015).2 
The buildings affected have a replacement 
cost of about $20 billion (in 2011 dollars). 
Sea level rise of up to three metres would 
affect over 280,000 people and damage 
Based on a study of 136 major coastal 
cities, ... in the absence of additional 
protective measures, sea level rise and 
related changes to storm surges, floods and 
major storms could cost globally as much 
as US$1 trillion annually by 2050 ...
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buildings with a replacement cost exceeding 
$50 billion (in 2011 dollars). Public 
infrastructure, including transport 
networks, energy systems and water 
services, will also be significantly affected 
(e.g. coastal roads and numerous waste 
water treatment plants). Much of this 
infrastructure is the responsibility of 
subnational government and some of it has 
not been well maintained (Office of the 
Auditor-General, 2014).
Several matters are clear: a) the costs 
will increase in a non-linear manner (i.e. 
as seas rise, the costs will rise even faster); 
b) the costs will be greater if global 
emissions peak late and then fall slowly; c) 
the costs will escalate significantly as the 
century advances; d) the costs will be 
greater if urban development continues in 
areas exposed to rising seas and inundation; 
e) the costs will fall unevenly geographically 
and intermittently; and f) the costs will be 
greater if governments (national and 
subnational) fail to plan and invest in 
effective risk reduction and adaptation 
initiatives. 
Aside from sea level rise, New Zealand 
faces many other climate-related costs. For 
instance, insured losses due to extreme 
weather events were $175 million in 2013 
and $135 million in 2014 (Insurance 
Council of New Zealand, 2017). The 
Treasury estimates that the drought in 2013 
cost New Zealand around $1.5 billion. 
Meanwhile, the cost of repairing land 
transport networks damaged by weather-
related events continues to increase, quite 
apart from the ongoing disruption to 
people and the economy. 
Fortunately, the impacts of climate 
change and their related costs can be 
reduced by preventing further housing 
developments in risky areas, relocating 
existing settlements, and prudent 
investments in more resilient infrastructure. 
Significantly, Local Government New 
Zealand estimates that $1 spent on risk 
reduction saves at least $3 in future disaster 
costs by avoiding losses and disruption 
(Deloitte Access Economics, 2013). Some 
international estimates of the likely savings 
are substantially higher (Healy and 
Malhotra, 2009). But there is a problem: 
public expenditure on pre-event risk 
reduction is much harder to ‘sell’ politically 
than the funding of post-disaster recovery. 
Voters, it seems, reward governments that 
spend money on disaster relief, but not 
those investing in prevention and 
preparedness (ibid.). This phenomenon is 
common across advanced democracies. It 
reflects humanity’s cognitive biases, 
including myopia: citizens tend to value 
post-event cures over preventative 
interventions (Boston, 2017a, 2017b; White 
and Haughton, 2017). Finding ways to 
counter such propensities will be crucial 
over the coming decades. Otherwise, there 
will be many sub-optimal policy decisions 
– ones that increase and entrench risk 
exposure, thereby placing additional 
burdens on future generations. This works 
in the opposite direction to what effective 
adaptation requires, namely to reduce risk 
now and for the future.
The problems with current funding, planning 
and regulatory frameworks
New Zealand’s current policy frameworks 
are poorly equipped to address the nature, 
magnitude and duration of the problems 
posed by climate change (Lawrence, 2015, 
2016).3 We address the most obvious 
limitations and deficiencies here.
First, while local authorities in New 
Zealand have various proactive legislative 
responsibilities to reduce the risks posed 
by natural hazards, including the effects of 
climate change, the relevant statutes (e.g. 
the Resource Management Act 1991 
(RMA), the Soil Conservation and Rivers 
Control Act 1941, the Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Act 2002 and the 
Building Act 2004) are poorly aligned. For 
instance, whereas the Building Act focuses 
on a 50-year time frame, the New Zealand 
Coastal Policy Statement issued under the 
RMA requires local authorities to look 
forward ‘at least 100 years’. Additionally, the 
various legislative and regulatory 
requirements are not being applied 
consistently by decision-makers. Some 
local authorities have been much more 
proactive than others. Guidance and 
support from central government has been 
generally insufficient.
Second, notwithstanding their 
responsibilities to mitigate long-term risks, 
many local authorities, often under 
pressure from property developers, have 
been approving major new subdivisions 
and other developments in areas that are 
likely to be vulnerable to rising seas later 
in the century (see, for example, Gibson 
and Mason, 2017). This suggests that 
current policy frameworks and regulatory 
standards may need adjustment, or at least 
that ways must be found to ensure that 
councils use their available powers more 
effectively to safeguard future interests.
Third, the existing policy arrangements 
focus too much on post-event responses 
(e.g. post-disaster assistance and recovery) 
and too little on pre-event responses – that 
is, public funding designed to enhance 
societal resilience, minimise risk, and 
enable cost-effective adjustments and 
transitions. Hence, New Zealand has a 
Natural Disaster Fund (administered by 
EQC) and an Adverse Events Fund 
(administered by the Ministry for Primary 
Industries to assist rural communities), but 
no equivalent dedicated funds to reduce 
risk exposure (i.e. arising from climate 
change). Similarly, there are different 
national-level policies for repairing and 
future-proofing local government 
infrastructure. For instance, the national 
Fortunately, the impacts of climate 
change and their related costs can 
be reduced by preventing further 
housing developments in risky areas, 
relocating existing settlements, and 
prudent investments in more resilient 
infrastructure. 
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civil defence plan provides for central 
government to contribute up to 60% of the 
costs of repairing underground water and 
sewerage services after a catastrophic event, 
but there are no similar guaranteed 
contributions for future-proofing 
infrastructure.4 
Fourth, and related to this, the 
provisions in most household insurance 
contracts (and related EQC cover) do not 
provide for ‘betterment’. This means, for 
instance, that an insurer will repair a home 
which is at risk of future flooding but will 
not contribute to the relocation of the 
home or the construction of a new home 
on a safer site. As a result, risk exposures 
have become entrenched. Eventually, some 
residents will be unable to secure adequate 
insurance for their properties.
Fifth, regarding the overall role of 
insurance, it is sometimes argued that 
governments should rely on private 
insurance markets, the pricing of risk and 
individual self-interest to generate the 
desired adaptive responses by citizens to 
climate change. But insurance merely 
redistributes and transfers risk; it does not 
lessen it. Hence, while insurance is a 
desirable – indeed vital – complement to 
robust risk management, it is no substitute 
for it. Moreover, the limitations of 
insurance markets will be exacerbated as 
risk profiles change over coming decades 
(IPCC, 2014; Kunreuther and Lyster, 2016; 
Storey et al., 2017; O’Hare, White and 
Connelly, 2016; Treasury, 2015).
Finally, aside from the post-event focus 
of much disaster-related funding, there are 
multiple other problems with existing 
funding arrangements for adaptation:
· Currently, local government owns and 
manages at least $120 billion of fixed 
assets (including 100% of the country’s 
drinking water, waste water and storm 
water assets, and 88% of the roads) 
(Office of the Auditor-General, 2014). 
But there is a gross mismatch between 
the resources and capabilities available 
to local authorities and the scale of their 
adaptation challenges. For instance, 
many communities (e.g. Dunedin, the 
eastern Bay of Plenty and the West 
Coast of the South Island) face the 
prospect of relocating significant 
numbers of people by mid-century, but 
they lack the capacity (via their rating 
base and borrowing limits) to fund 
large-scale relocation of affected assets 
and communities, the purchase of land 
for resettlement, and the construction 
of new infrastructure. More generally, 
many local authorities – and especially 
those with ageing populations – will 
struggle to raise the capital necessary 
for renewing, upgrading and future-
proofing their public infrastructure. 
· The current mechanisms through 
which the central government provides 
financial assistance to communities, 
businesses and households affected by 
natural disasters tend to be ad hoc and 
inconsistent. For instance, in response 
to the severe flooding of Edgecumbe in 
the Bay of Plenty in 2017, where around 
70% of the town’s properties were 
damaged, the government announced 
that EQC would be responsible for 
cleaning up and repairing all affected 
properties, including the 100 or so that 
were not insured or where the owners 
lacked the necessary funds to undertake 
repairs. Residents in many other 
communities similarly affected by 
severe flooding have not always been 
so fortunate. Meanwhile, special 
arrangements were made for the many 
thousands of Christchurch residents 
whose properties were ‘red-zoned’ as a 
result of the major earthquakes in 
2010–11.
· Leaving aside the inequities caused by 
inconsistent Crown ‘bailouts’ following 
natural disasters, bailouts cause several 
other problems. First, they raise public 
expectations of continued structural 
protection and funding assistance. This 
creates a high degree of path 
dependence, at least politically, and 
perpetuates lock-in of communities in 
risky areas. Second, it generates a 
potential ‘safety paradox’, where 
communities are lulled into a feeling of 
safety which can then rebound on 
public authorities when the next 
‘disaster’ happens. 
· There is no current consistent and 
centrally managed mechanism for 
funding the costs of managed retreat 
(see Box 1). As a result, local authorities 
are attempting to develop their own 
approaches. But these will generate 
inconsistencies and inequities across 
New Zealand. Moreover, without a fair, 
consistent and nationally mandated 
approach to adaptation funding, 
affected residents are likely to resist 
locally crafted proposals for managed 
retreat. This poses at least three 
problems: a) the risk of lengthy and 
expensive legal proceedings; b) the 
prospect of prevarication and long 
delays in decision making, thereby 
intensifying risk exposure, exacerbating 
future damages, and increasing the 
overall long-term costs of adjustment; 
and c) the likelihood that residents will 
demand the construction of hard 
structures to protect their properties; 
in many cases such structures will not 
be cost-effective and will offer only 
temporary protection.
· There are no mechanisms to ensure that 
the costs of climate change adaptation 
are shared equitably, whether 
intergenerationally or intra-
generationally. 
In short, current regulatory, planning 
and funding arrangements are not 
adequate for the policy challenges posed 
by climate change. This applies not only 
Adaptation funding arrangements 
which seek to reduce exposure to 
climate change risks should have 
two overarching goals: long-term cost 
minimisation and equitable burden 
sharing.
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to the problems generated by sea level rise 
and more severe rainfall events, but also 
to many of the other impacts that climate 
change will generate (e.g. the impacts on 
agriculture, aquaculture and fishing 
resulting from warmer temperatures, 
more severe droughts and ocean 
acidification). Without appropriate 
reforms, existing policy frameworks are 
destined to increase, rather than reduce, 
risk exposure, exacerbate future 
adaptation costs, and contribute to 
multiple inequities. In the interests of 
sound anticipatory governance, a better 
framework is required.
Funding climate change adaptation – 
guiding principles
Any new policy framework for climate 
change adaptation must be guided by 
sound principles. Adaptation funding 
arrangements which seek to reduce 
exposure to climate change risks should 
have two overarching goals: long-term 
cost minimisation and equitable burden 
sharing.
1. Long-term cost minimisation – funding 
arrangements should seek to minimise 
the long-term net costs of climate 
change adaptation by encouraging 
cost-effective decisions regarding 
district planning and investment in 
public infrastructure. The aim would 
be to reduce the likely costs of climate-
related impacts (e.g. from major floods) 
through cost-effective measures to 
future-proof infrastruc-ture and 
undertake managed retreat. Successful 
adaptation will, in turn, help to reduce 
future insurance (including EQC) costs, 
thereby keeping insurance more 
affordable and available. Consistent 
with this, funding arrangements, and 
related planning and regulatory 
frameworks, must be well-coordinated 
and designed to minimise moral hazard 
(e.g. the risk of giving individuals, 
companies or other organisations 
incentives to act in ways that are likely 
to increase overall adaptation costs and/
or shift costs inappropriately onto 
taxpayers or ratepayers).
2. Equitable burden sharing – funding 
arrangements should be consistent 
with widely accepted principles of 
social equity (or distributive justice) 
(Kunreuther and Pauly, 2017). Such 
principles include the fair opportunity 
requirement. This is the idea that 
people should not be discriminated 
against or suffer disadvantages for 
things over which they have little or 
no control. Such a principle provides 
an ethical basis for funding assistance 
for people who suffer an accident or 
are harmed by a natural disaster which 
could not have been reasonably 
foreseen or avoided. Another relevant 
principle is that of ‘comparative justice’ 
Technically, ‘managed retreat’ has been defined in a coastal 
setting as ‘the application of coastal zone management and 
mitigation tools designed to move existing and planned 
development out of the path of eroding coastlines and coastal 
hazards’ (quoted in Hino, Field and Mach, 2017, p.1). It is 
deliberate, coordinated and planned. The aim is to reduce 
natural hazard risk permanently, rather than temporarily. 
According to Hino, Field and Mach, over the past three 
decades approximately 1.3 million people in 22 countries 
have been relocated – in both pre- and post-disaster contexts 
and both voluntarily and involuntarily – through managed 
retreat. While significant, this is a tiny number compared to 
the scale of displacement expected during the 21st century 
and beyond (which will affect hundreds of millions globally). 
Understandably, managed retreat is often viewed as complex 
and controversial, partly because of the financial costs, but also 
because of the more intangible costs – the loss of ‘place’, the 
social, emotional and psychological challenges of displacing 
people from their homes, the disruption to community life, 
and the loss of buildings or land of architectural, aesthetic or 
spiritual value. However, managed retreat can be implemented 
in a staged and progressive manner, as ‘managed’ suggests, 
preferably through community engagement processes that can 
address the sense of loss of place and value.
An example in New Zealand where managed retreat has 
been implemented is Twin Streams in Waitäkere, Auckland 
(Vandenbeld and MacDonald, 2013). Voluntary property 
purchase was offered within an inclusive participatory process 
across the community which linked environmental, social, 
economic and cultural goals by providing new public resources 
and accommodating those who moved to other areas. The 
availability of a regional fund enabled the retreat from flooding 
to be implemented. 
Managed retreat options are being considered currently as 
part of a suite of adaptation options in two coastal localities. In 
Matatä in the Bay of Plenty a voluntary retreat option has been 
included after ten years of investigations following a weather-
induced debris flow that engulfed a coastal community.5 For 
voluntary retreat, landowner support will be essential for any 
property purchase arrangements. If retreat were to be enforced, 
empowering legislation is likely to be required. Funding to 
incentivise implementation is beyond the means of most district 
councils, which means that regional and central government 
funding would be required. Other issues make implementation 
difficult: rating equity; confirmation of retreat boundaries; 
availability of affordable alternative building sites; existing use 
rights; planning issues; and property purchase criteria. 
In the second case, the Clifton to Tangoio Coastal Hazards 
Strategy 2120 in Hawke’s Bay included managed retreat within 
adaptive pathways for the medium-to-long term in a year-
long community engagement process that has recommended 
adaptive pathways to the three participating councils for 
implementation.6
Box 1: Managed retreat
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or ‘like treatment’: cases that are alike 
in all relevant respects should be 
treated alike; where cases differ, 
‘material principles’ of justice can be 
applied to determine the extent to 
which, and the means by which, 
differential treatment is justified. 
These include considerations of need, 
the capacity to pay, and various 
notions of moral responsibility (Miller, 
2007). One of the latter, known as 
‘outcome responsibility’, is the idea that 
people (and public authorities) should 
bear responsibility for their own 
actions and decisions. Another is the 
idea of ‘remedial responsibility’: this 
responsibility arises whenever there is 
a situation needing a remedy. If those 
who have caused the harm are in a 
position to rectify the problem, then 
they have a moral responsibility to do 
so. If they unable to, but there are 
others with the requisite capacity (e.g. 
a central government), then the 
remedial responsibility falls to those 
who are most capable. Regarding the 
costs of climate change adaptation, the 
relevant principles of distributive 
justice should be applied both 
intergenerationally and intra-
generationally. 
Any adaptation funding framework 
(and related institutional arrangements 
and policy instruments) should also take 
into account a range of other considerations 
(Boston, 2017a), including:
· making the best possible use of the 
available scientific evidence and 
relevant expert advice;
· minimising administrative and 
compliance costs;
· ensuring procedural fairness and 
thereby minimising the likelihood of 
costly litigation;
· ensuring sufficient policy clarity, 
consistency and stability over time to 
facilitate effective long-term regional 
spatial planning and infrastructure 
investment, thus generating an 
adequate degree of certainty for 
affected households, businesses and 
other organisations;
· enabling sufficient policy flexibility to 
accommodate changing risk profiles;
· disincentivising policy responses that 
create path dependence;
· ensuring a high level of transparency 
in relation to revenue collection and 
funding allocations; and
· ensuring fiscal sustainability.
Applying these principles to the 
question of who pays, for what and when 
raises some practical questions. First, is 
there a case for pre-funding some of the 
expected costs of adaptation? Second, are 
there grounds for the central government 
to contribute to the adaptation costs facing 
subnational governments? Third, is there 
a case for public authorities compensating 
those harmed by the impacts of climate 
change: for instance, by funding some or 
all of citizens’ private property losses 
(including land) or funding some or all of 
the costs of managed retreat (e.g. moving 
expenses, the loss of business income, 
providing risk-free land, etc.)? 
The issue of pre-funding future adaptation 
costs
The case for pre-funding rests primarily 
on the principle of responsibility, namely 
that those who have caused a harm should 
be required to contribute to alleviating the 
damage they have caused (or will cause 
in the future). This principle of justice is 
embodied in the idea of polluter pays. In 
the case of climate change, the damage 
that will be inflicted on current and 
future generations (and hence the costs of 
adaptation that they will bear) is largely 
due to the activities of recent generations. 
Accordingly, there is a strong case for 
taxing current citizens (e.g. taxpayers and 
ratepayers) and building up a public fund 
(or funds) which can be deployed to help 
cover the financial costs of adapting to 
climate change later in the century.
Against this, the scale of the costs of 
adaptation remains uncertain. Also, future 
technological innovations may significantly 
reduce them, thus enhancing their 
affordability. Perhaps the strongest 
objection, however, is the claim that future 
generations will be better off than current 
generations, at least in terms of real 
incomes per capita. Hence, they will be in 
a better position than those alive today to 
cover the long-term costs of adaptation. 
Also, if the costs are much less than some 
fear, future governments will have little 
difficulty covering them from normal 
ongoing revenues.
But there can be no guarantee that 
future generations will be better off, 
however ‘better off ’ is defined. After all, 
humanity’s failure to live within safe and 
sustainable planetary boundaries may curb 
future economic growth. And even if per 
capita incomes continue to rise, there 
remain strong moral grounds for those 
who have caused climate-related harm to 
bear part of the cost. Societies do not, after 
all, avoid prosecuting and penalising 
criminals who are poorer than their victims. 
In our view, there is a plausible prima 
facie case for proportionate pre-funding of 
future costs of climate change adaptation. 
This suggests that any overall adaptation 
funding framework should include a 
mechanism – perhaps similar in concept 
to the New Zealand Superannuation Fund 
– to help cover future climate-related 
liabilities. A potential source for pre-
funding could be revenue generated via an 
additional levy on fossil fuels, with the 
pooled funds invested and then drawn 
down progressively later in the century. 
National cost sharing
There are multiple grounds for sharing 
the costs of adaptation across central and 
subnational government, including the 
considerations of efficiency and equity 
(including the principle of remedial 
responsibility). As noted earlier, adaptation 
costs are bound to vary – often significantly 
... even if per capita incomes continue to 
rise, there remain strong moral grounds 
for those who have caused climate-
related harm to bear part of the cost.
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– across different households, communities, 
regions and economic sectors. Many of the 
costs will fall in arbitrary ways, with little or 
no regard to the extent of each citizen’s (or 
region’s) contribution to climate change 
(i.e. via their cumulative greenhouse 
gas emissions) or their capacity to pay 
either for the damages inflicted or for the 
measures required to minimise future 
risks (e.g. by relocating to safer locations). 
Importantly, the resources available to 
subnational governments to implement 
prudent and cost-effective adaptation 
measures vary (depending on their relative 
wealth, demographic structure, etc.). Some 
may face only modest costs, yet have ample 
resources; others will face very large 
costs, yet have limited resources. Without 
some form of national cost sharing, the 
principles of need and ability to pay will 
almost certainly be violated. Equally, it will 
be hard for poorer communities to find 
the resources necessary to fund proactive 
measures to mitigate future risks.
Public compensation for losses
The question of whether those faced with 
the loss of property (including land) and/or 
income should receive public compensation 
is challenging (Sprinz and von Bünau, 
2013). There are various, often conflicting, 
principles. For instance, it might seem 
inequitable to provide compensation to 
wealthy people who have purchased second 
or third homes on vulnerable coasts in the 
full knowledge that climate change might 
render their properties uninhabitable at 
some future date. Against this, it is often 
hard to determine whether particular 
risks could have reasonably been foreseen 
and how readily those affected can bear 
the expected losses. In practice, many of 
the situations that will arise over coming 
decades are likely to be complex, not least 
because of rapidly changing risk profiles 
and unpleasant surprises. For instance, 
increased drought risk will have impacts 
on the range within which current land 
uses can operate, triggering potentially 
disruptive changes if inadequately 
anticipated and planned for, stranding 
assets and livelihoods. Similarly, coastal 
areas previously deemed to be safe may 
unexpectedly face the risk of inundation 
or the sea level may rise much faster in 
certain areas than previously projected. In 
some cases the relevant authorities may 
be obliged to force people to relocate to 
safer areas. Where compulsion is involved 
in acquiring land, there has been a long 
history in New Zealand (and elsewhere) of 
providing compensation to those directly 
affected (and sometimes those indirectly 
affected). The provisions relating to such 
compensation in New Zealand are set out 
in considerable detail in the Public Works 
Act 1981.
While designing compensatory 
arrangements is beyond the scope of this 
article, several matters deserve emphasis:
· Given the long-standing practice in 
New Zealand of societal risk pooling 
and cost sharing for natural disasters, 
the public are likely to expect 
governments to compensate (at least 
partially) those suffering loss and 
damage from climate change, including 
those facing significant costs in order 
to reduce climate-related risks (e.g. 
relocation). In these circumstances, any 
government pronouncement that 
compensation will not be provided (e.g. 
to those who build in certain vulnerable 
areas) is unlikely to be believed. In 
short, a credible commitment problem 
seems bound to arise.
· There will be strong pressures, in the 
interests of overall fairness, for any 
compensatory arrangements to be 
broadly consistent, both across the 
country and over extended periods of 
time. This points to the need for a 
nationally mandated framework with 
cross-party support. 
· In the absence of a well-designed, 
principled and consistent system of 
compensation, there will be political 
pressures for governments to implement 
high-cost engineering ‘solutions’ to 
protect vulnerable properties (and also 
threats of legal action). Yet many of these 
potential ‘adaptations’ will provide only 
temporary respite. 
· Pre-event compensation could generate 
moral hazard (e.g. by encouraging risky 
investments). It will be imperative to 
mitigate such risks through well-
designed regulatory and planning 
frameworks. 
Any compensatory regime will be 
controversial and its implementation open 
to fraudulent claims.7 As indicated, there 
are many relevant principles and 
considerations, and some of these will be 
in tension. It will be important, therefore, 
to design any regime carefully, with proper 
public engagement on the relevant issues 
and options, and detailed stakeholder 
involvement.
Reforming the funding of climate change 
adaptation – the broad options
In terms of the future funding of climate 
change adaptation, there are at least four 
possible options:
1. expand and modify existing local 
government funding instruments;
2. expand and modify existing central 
government funding instruments 
(excluding EQC), albeit in the context 
of annual appropriations;
3. amend the legislative mandate of EQC 
so that it becomes responsible for both 
pre-disaster funding (i.e. for protective 
and preventative measures) and post-
disaster funding; and
... it might seem inequitable to provide 
compensation to ... people who have 
purchased second or third homes on 
vulnerable coasts in the full knowledge 
that climate change might render their 
properties uninhabitable at some future 
date.
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4. establish a new national Climate 
Change Adaptation Fund with a 
statutory mandate to fully fund, part-
fund or co-fund various specified 
adaptation-related costs.
In our view, the first three options are 
unlikely to satisfy the relevant funding 
principles discussed above. Hence, the 
fourth option is the one that could be 
developed further, potentially to apply to 
the full range of climate change impacts.
Regarding option 1, as previously 
argued, existing local government funding 
arrangements will not be sufficient to meet 
the expected costs of climate change 
adaptation, including large-scale managed 
retreat and major infrastructure 
investments. Only central government has 
the necessary resources and mechanisms 
to undertake such tasks.
Regarding option 2, central government 
could, at least in theory, rely on existing 
funding instruments, using annual 
appropriations to co-fund some of the 
costs of climate change adaptation. 
Potentially, it could also fund specific 
adaptation projects (including managed 
retreat) directly, rather than funding local 
authorities to do it. The funding of ‘red-
zoned’ properties in Christchurch provides 
a possible model (Canterbury Earthquake 
Recovery Authority, 2016). But such 
arrangements would be ad hoc and thus 
unlikely to generate the desired level of 
consistency, certainty, stability, credibility 
or long-term durability. Moreover, as the 
scale of the adaptation challenges increases 
over coming decades, there are bound to 
be political pressures – from subnational 
governments, civil society and affected 
citizens – for the central government to 
develop more comprehensive, principled 
and tailored approaches. Aside from this, 
there would be limited scope under current 
fiscal arrangements for specific pre-funding 
of future adaptation costs, except via more 
concerted efforts to reduce net Crown debt. 
Option 3 would involve amending the 
legislative mandate of EQC and extending 
the role of the Natural Disaster Fund to 
include proactive, pre-event adaptation 
funding. Arguably, this would provide EQC 
with both a stronger incentive and a greater 
capacity to reduce post-disaster costs 
through cost-effective adaptation measures. 
Assuming that the commission was 
adequately funded to undertake such 
interventions, it could reduce the 
commission’s future liabilities and the 
overall financial costs of climate change 
impacts. Further, under such an approach 
responsibilities for (some aspects of) 
funding adaptation would be assigned to 
an independent body operating in 
accordance with statutory criteria. 
Potentially this would increase the 
likelihood of funding decisions being 
evidence-informed and principled, and 
broadly consistent over time, thus 
increasing the fairness and legitimacy of 
the policy regime. A modified EQC could 
also incorporate an element of pre-funding 
for future adaptation costs.
Against this, giving EQC major 
responsibilities for pre-event adaptation 
funding would fundamentally alter the 
commission’s current role as an insurer. It 
would result in the commission having 
multiple and potentially conflicting 
objectives – serving simultaneously as an 
insurer of residential properties (with a 
primary focus on seismic events), a 
mechanism for mitigating a wide range of 
risks, and a funder (or co-funder) of often 
large-scale adaptation projects, including 
major infrastructure investments and 
residential relocation. Among other things, 
it would raise questions over whether the 
insurance mandate of EQC should be 
extended (e.g. to include public property 
and businesses). It would also pose the risk 
that any fund that was built up over time to 
help pay for the future costs of adaptation 
could be depleted (unless quarantined 
separately from the post-disaster fund) 
every time a major natural disaster occurred. 
Aside from this, questions would arise 
about how EQC should be funded. 
Currently, those who are not insured, 
together with commercial property owners, 
do not pay the EQC levy. Yet many of these 
households and businesses will stand to 
gain significantly if the EQC becomes a 
pre-event funder of managed retreat and 
other large-scale, area-wide adaptation 
responses. Lastly, effective pre-event 
planning and adaptation will require 
extensive public consultation and 
deliberation. Such processes and 
procedures are far removed from those 
currently undertaken by EQC. This, in turn, 
would entail very different skills and 
expertise. For such reasons, we do not 
favour option 3.
The final option would be to create a 
new funding entity – such as a Climate 
Change Adaptation Fund – and modify 
other policy settings accordingly. The 
primary aims of such an entity would be 
to enhance the capacity for sound 
anticipatory governance through the 
funding of cost-effective and equitable 
responses, thereby reducing climate change 
risk exposure over time and minimising 
future damage and loss. Ideally, such a fund 
would complement existing post-event 
funding mechanisms, such as EQC and 
private insurance arrangements, so long as 
conflicting outcomes between them were 
addressed at the same time. As with the 
Natural Disaster Fund, a funding pool 
could be built up over several decades for 
allocation increasingly over the century, 
thereby enabling the burden of climate 
change adaptation to be shared more fairly 
across several generations.
An advantage of such an approach is 
that it would enable policymakers to 
establish a purpose-built institution with 
a specific and enduring statutory mandate. 
Creating any new statutory funding entity, 
however, raises multiple and complex 
design issues. These include its institutional 
form and mode of governance and the 
The primary aims [of a new funding entity] 
would be to enhance the capacity for 
sound anticipatory governance through 
the funding of cost-effective and equitable 
responses ...
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nature and scope of its funding 
responsibilities (e.g. whether these should 
cover the full range of climate change 
impacts or only specific types, and whether 
there should be transitional assistance 
available for industries or regions facing 
large-scale, compounded climate-related 
impacts). Similarly, there is the question of 
what specific costs should be funded, to 
what extent and in accordance with what 
criteria. Different types of responses (e.g. 
investment in public infrastructure, the 
funding of managed retreat, transitional 
assistance, etc.) would require very different 
criteria. At the same time, any large-scale 
relocations will require new infrastructure 
investments, so the two functions would 
need to be properly integrated. 
Related to this, concomitant changes to 
current regional and district planning 
arrangements would also need to be made. 
If the central government becomes a major 
funder of adaptation – albeit via an arm’s-
length statutory entity – it would require 
a greater influence over long-term spatial 
planning, not least to minimise the risk of 
moral hazard. But this raises important 
constitutional issues regarding the 
respective roles of central and subnational 
government, some of which are bound to 
be politically sensitive. Consideration of 
such institutional design issues raised here 
deserves rigorous analysis and public 
deliberation.
Conclusion
New Zealand’s existing institutional 
arrangements are poorly designed for 
the adaptation challenges posed by 
climate change: they are too ad hoc and 
post hoc, inadequately proactive and 
preventative, and poorly integrated. Not 
only are overall resources insufficient for 
the required adaptive responses – such 
as building resilient public infrastructure, 
undertaking large-scale managed retreat, 
and transitioning to more sustainable rural 
land uses as the frequency and magnitude 
of impacts increase – but in many cases 
there is a gross mismatch between the 
resources and capabilities available to 
local authorities and the scale of the 
task in hand. For such reasons, current 
arrangements will not achieve the goals of 
cost minimisation and equitable burden 
sharing, whether intra-generationally 
or intergenerationally. Instead, they will 
contribute to sub-optimal decisions 
and outcomes, thereby unnecessarily 
burdening future generations. As part 
of any comprehensive plan to enhance 
the country’s adaptive capacity, there is a 
good case for establishing a new national, 
publicly administered fund that is pre-event 
and preventative. Such a fund would need 
to be carefully designed, with the relevant 
criteria for its funding responsibilities 
clearly prescribed in enabling legislation. 
Creating such a fund would require 
potentially significant changes to current 
spatial planning rules, building regulations, 
insurance arrangements and the funding 
of local infrastructure. Accordingly, any 
move in this direction will need thorough 
independent scrutiny, extensive public 
deliberation and a concerted political 
effort to achieve a durable cross-party 
consensus on the new policy framework.
1 For analyses of ‘anticipatory governance’, see Boston 
(2017b), Guston (2014) and Quay (2010).
2 This study covered only the more populated regions of New 
Zealand. It included only some infrastructure assets.
3 See also recent contributions from the Society of Local 
Government Managers (2015) and Local Government New 
Zealand (2016a, 2016b).
4 Note that a Housing Infrastructure Fund was announced 
in early February 2017. This is designed to assist councils 
in high-growth areas with significant housing pressures 
to fund new public infrastructure (including water supply, 
storm water, waste water and roading). Funding of around 
$1 billion is available to eligible councils via a competitive 
bidding process.
5 ‘A process towards a settlement framework to mitigate 
debris flow risk – Awatarariki fanhead, Matatä’, https://
www.whakatane.govt.nz/sites/www.whakatane.govt.nz/files/
documents/about-council/council-projects/debris-flow-and-
landslide-hazards/policy_committee_2_july_2015.pdf.
6 Clifton to Tangoio Coastal Hazards Strategy, http://www.
hbcoast.co.nz/strategy-development/.
7 So far in Christchurch, for instance, EQC has identified 
fraudulent claims following the earthquakes worth about 
$4.6 million, and 979 fraudulent claims have been 
prosecuted. 
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